Competition in the Telecom sector

Find a series of insightful contributions around a topic of major interest on the contribution of telecom operators in the development of the European Economic Area.
    

The impact of license duration on tangible investments of mobile - July 2019

Using data from the WCIS (World Cellular Information Service) and the Telecoms Market Matrix of Analysis Mason, we were able to build a database relating the level of investment percapita to license duration for 14 countries over a 10-year period. An empirical analysis of the data shows a positive correlation between the tangible investment per capita and the license duration (the average of all active licenses or the latest license). More precisely, we observe an increase of e1.5 in the average investment per capita per year for each additional year of license duration.
We also find no significant negative impact of license duration on mobile market competition.
The competition outcomes are measured using the Lerner index at the operator level. Some robustness checks are performed at the country level by using the HHI (Herfindahl-Hirschmanind ex) and the number of active mobile operators as measures of the level of competition, and we
obtain additional results indicating once more that the competition is not negatively impacted by license duration.  

Four economic questions concerning European competition policy – April 2019

Competition, technological change and Productivity gains: a sectoral analysis – February 2019

Investments in Telecommunications Services higher in the US than in the EU: a robust, enduring and increasing gap observed whatever the source – june 2018

 

Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition – January 2018

Price collusion between competitors is considered as one of the most serious infringement of competition law and is severely punished by regulatory authorities. However, two economists among the most influential in competition policy, Patrick Rey and the Nobel Prize in economics, Jean Tirole, demonstrate in this paper that the possibility for companies to agree on price caps, subject to the authorization of competition authorities, would increase consumer welfare.

These economic results are not taken up by the authorities’ doctrine to date.

Estimating the impact of FttH co-investment on coverage, adoption and competition – January 2018

Impact of competition, investment and regulation on prices of mobile services: Evidence from France – November 2017

 

Entry and Merger Policy – August 2017

 

The European mobile mergers controversy – May 2017

 

What Level of Competition Intensity Maximises Investment in the Wireless Industry? – April 2016

Impact of number of mobile operators on investments - December 2015

What causes the megabyte price drop in the mobile industry? – April 2015

A symmetrical regulation for an intensified very high broadband deployment – Working paper - March 2015

 

Towards Guidelines for Efficiency Analysis in Mergers and Antitrust Cases - Institut d’Économie Industrielle - May 2014

 

Competition and investment – Institut d’Économie Industrielle - March 2014

 

The economics of margin squeeze – Industrial Economic Institute - March 2014

 

Supercollider : European mobile consolidation is win-win for operators and citizens alike – HSBC Global Resarch - February 2014

 

Regulation of monopoly – Industrial  Economic Institute - September 2010